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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported on December 17, 2019, there
were 5,250 fatal workplace injuries in the US in 2018, up 2% from 5,147 in 2017. Additionally,
there were 3,552 fatal accidents at work in the European Union during 2017 (Eurostat, 2020).
Occupational injuries and fatalities take an even more significant toll in lower middle-income
countries.
Safety issues are related to the development of enterprises and also to the health of
employees' families. Furthermore, safety is concerned with various hazards that may result in
accidents causing harm to people, property and the environment. In the safety field, the risk is
typically defined as the "likelihood and severity of hazardous events." Since safety is directly
related to risk, risk measurement methods and risk reduction techniques are becoming more
essential to be implemented in the work-place to ensure the safety of employees, and maintain a
smooth production process. Without incident management, it is difficult to fully assess the risks in
a given scenario to further prevent workplace accidents. However, traditional incident analysis
usually only focuses on surface phenomena. But, there are still a lot of deep-seated reasons in
incident management, so it is necessary to conduct in-depth studies of data in terms of incidents.
If a company can control the probability of accidents within an acceptable range, then it
can effectively control the occurrence of them. Thus, this research takes place at a manufacturing
facility (K-Company), and the aim is to provide a systematic method for analyzing and improving
incident management in the manufacturing process. The specific location and name of the facility
are omitted from this research in order to avoid a negative impact and evaluation of K-Company
from the public and consumers due to the mismanagement of the accident. The company in
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question is a comprehensive industrial group integrating high-end oil equipment and
manufacturing oilfield integration, which is mainly engaged in oil drilling and other parts of the
industry's machinery manufacturing. With more than 8,000 employees, K-Company is an oil and
gas equipment production and service provider with its headquarters. In recent years, frequent
company accidents have had a great impact on employees' life, safety, and company property.
1.2 Purpose of Research
The purpose of this thesis is to apply the DMAIC process improvement methodology in
the Safety field to propose a scheme to improve the incident management of the manufacturing
process. This thesis will build a DMAIC model, which stands for Define, Measure, Analyze,
Improve, and Control within the whole process. Additionally, this thesis also aims to identify the
key factors responsible for incident management by using a Pareto Chart and a combination of
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), as well as the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to provide the
potential for a structured decision method for incident management. The results of this study are
likely to be applied to successfully further safety management. The reason being is that, as a highly
reliable analysis method, DMAIC, FTA, as well as AHP combined, can all be widely used in the
industrial field.
1.3 Objectives of Research
The following points are the main objectives of this research.
•

Create a DMAIC improvement program for incident management.

•

Identify the key factors responsible for incident management by using the Pareto

Chart.
•

Analyze the root causes of accidents by FTA and incident improvement priorities

through the AHP.
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1.4 Significance of Research
In the past, the word "accident" was often used to refer to an unplanned, unwanted event,
and to many people, an "accident" is a random, unavoidable event. However, almost all worksite
deaths, injuries, and illnesses are preventable. OSHA recommends the use of the term "incident"
for investigation. Therefore, incident management is crucial regardless of business, size, or
industry. Without effective incident management, a company will put its employees, customers,
brand reputation, and revenues at risk by failing to take appropriate safety measures and
precautions.
This thesis provides a systematic method for the improvement of incident management to
find out the underlying or root causes of accidents in the manufacturing process, to reduce or
eliminate the serious consequences of similar incidents in the future. Additionally, analysis of
incidents during the production process with DMAIC process improvement methodology provides
employers and workers with the opportunity to identify hazards in their operations and defects in
safety and health programs. Most importantly, it enables employers and workers to identify and
implement the corrective actions necessary to prevent future accidents.
1.5 Assumptions and Limitations
Most safety activities are reactive and not proactive. Many organizations wait for losses to
occur before taking steps to prevent a recurrence. Near miss incidents often precede loss producing
incidents but are largely ignored because nothing (no injury, damage or loss) occurred. Employees
are not encouraged to report these close calls as there has been no disruption or loss in the form of
injuries or property damage. This could lead to deviations in the data collection phase from the
basic incidents that occur.
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1.6 Definition of Terms
Incident is referred to as a work-related incident(s) in which an injury or ill health (regardless of
severity) or fatality occurred or could have occurred. (OHSAS 18001, 2007)
Accident is an unplanned and uncontrolled incident in which the action or reaction of an object,
substance, person or radiation results in personal injury or the probability thereof. (Bird, F.,
Germain, G.,1966.)
DMAIC is a data-driven quality strategy used to improve processes. It is an integral
part of a Six Sigma initiative, but in general can be implemented as a standalone quality
improvement procedure or as part of other process improvement initiatives such as lean. (Connie
M. Borror, 2009)
Near Miss is an incident in which no property was damaged and no personal injury was sustained,
but where, given a slight shift in time or position, damage or injury easily could have occurred.
Near misses also may be referred to as close calls, near accidents, accident precursors, injury-free
incidents, and in the case of moving objects, near collisions.
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a top-down, deductive failure analysis in which an undesired state of
a system is analyzed using Boolean logic to combine a series of lower-level incidents. Example
is shown in figure 1. This analysis method is mainly used in safety engineering and reliability
engineering to understand how systems can fail to identify the best ways to reduce risk and to
determine (or get a feeling for) incident rates of a safety accident or a particular system level
(functional) failure.
Analytic

hierarchy

process (AHP)

is

a

structured

technique

for

organizing

and

analyzing complex decisions based on mathematics and psychology. It represents an accurate
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approach for quantifying the weights of decision criteria. Individual experts' experiences are
utilized to estimate the relative magnitudes of factors through pairwise comparisons.

Figure 1. Fault tree for two lights in a room.
Retrieve from: https://www.intechopen.com/books/concise-reliability-for-engineers/fault-treeanalysis-and-reliability-block-diagrams
Pareto Chart is a type of bar chart in which the various factors that contribute to an overall effect
are arranged in order according to the magnitude of their effect. The bars are arranged in
descending order of height from left to right. This means the categories represented by the tall
bars on the left are relatively more significant than those on the right. Example is shown in figure
2.
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Figure 2: sample Pareto diagram. Retrieved from: Pareto Chart, Minnesota Department of
Health from http://www.health.state.mn.us/2016
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 DMAIC
The DMAIC model systematically helps organizations solve problems and improve
processes by defining, measuring, analyzing, improving, and controlling five interrelated phases.
Dale et al. (2007) briefly described the DMAIC phase as follows:
Define – this stage within the DMAIC process involves defining the team's role, project
scope and boundary, customer requirements and expectations and the goals of selected projects
(Gijo; Scaria; Antony, 2011).
Measure – this phase of measurement involves the selection of measurement factors that
need to be improved (Omachonu; Ross, 2004), and provides a structure to evaluate current
performance, as well as evaluate, compare, and monitor subsequent improvements and their
capabilities (Stamatis, 2004).
Analyze – the focus of this analysis phase is to identify the root cause of the problem
(defect) (Omachonu; Ross, 2004), understanding why defects have occurred, and comparing and
prioritizing opportunities to promote improvement (Adams; Gupta. Wilson JR.2003).
Improve – improve this step by focusing on experimental and statistical techniques that
may result in improved reduction of quality problems or defects (Omachonu; Ross, 2004).
Control – finally, the final stage in the DMAIC process ensures the persistence of
improvement (Omachonu; Ross, 2004), This continuous performance is monitored. Process
improvement is also documented and institutionalized.
DMAIC is similar to Deming's continuous learning and process improvement model, Plando-check-act (PDCA) (Deming, 1993). In the Six Sigma approach, DMAIC works by providing a
structured approach to solving business problems.
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Pyzdek (2003) believes that DMAIC is a learning model. Although it focuses on
performing improvement activities, it emphasizes the collection and analysis of data before
performing any improvement activities. This provides a platform for DMAIC users to make
decisions and takes actions based on real and scientific facts rather than experience and knowledge,
as is the case in many organizations, small and medium enterprises (Garza-Reyes, et al. 2010).
2.2 Fault Tree Analysis
The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was originally developed by H.A. Watson of Bell
Telephone Lab, originally commissioned by the U.S. Air Force's 526th ICBM System Group to
evaluate the launch control system for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (Ericson,
Clifton, 1999). After that, FTA becomes a tool for reliability analysis. Launch control safety
studies for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were first published in 1962 using fault tree
analysis technology, followed by Boeing and Avco, which began using fault tree analysis in the
Minuteman II System in 1963-64. The techniques of fault tree analysis were widely reported at the
1965 Systems Safety Symposium in Seattle, sponsored by Boeing and the University of
Washington. Boeing began applying fault tree analysis to the design of civil aircraft in 1966
(Hixenbaugh, A. F.,1968). In 1976, the U.S. Army Equipment Command incorporated FTA into
the Engineering Design Manual for reliability design (Evans, Ralph A, 1976).
In the early days of the Apollo program, people asked about the possibility of successfully
sending astronauts to the moon and returning them safely to Earth. Some risk or reliability
calculation has been made, and the result is an unacceptably low probability of mission success.
This result precluded further quantitative risk or reliability analysis by NASA prior to the 1986
Challenger accident. Instead, NASA decided to rely on failure mode and impact analysis (FMEA)
and other qualitative methods for system safety assessments. After the Challenger accident, people
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recognized the importance of structural risk assessment (PRA) and FTA in system risk and
reliability analysis and began to be applied in NASA. Currently, FTA is considered as one of the
most important systems reliability and safety analysis technologies.
In addition, in order to assess and analyze risks, the FTA approach is most appropriate
because of its outstanding characteristics in identifying risk issues. It is worth noting that FTA is
a documented method used to determine the underlying causes of a given undesired incident. It
involves the construction of the error tree and starts with a top-level incident (Vesely et al., 1981).
2.3 Analytic Hierarchy Process
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a structured technique based on mathematics and
psychology to organize and analyze complex decisions. It was developed in the 1970s by Thomas
L. Saaty, who, in collaboration with Ernest Forman, developed Expert Choice in 1983, and has
been extensively studied and refined since then. It represents a method to accurately quantify the
weight of decision criteria. The experience of individual experts estimates the relative size of
factors by pairwise comparison (Saaty TL., 2008).
AHP has been applied to many problem situations; Selection of competitive schemes,
allocation and prediction of scarce resources in the multi-objective environment. Although AHP
has broad applicability, its axiomatic basis carefully limits the scope of the problem environment
(Saaty TL., 2008). It is based on the clearly defined mathematical structure of a consistent matrix
and its associated right eigenvector ability to produce true or approximate weights.
Law et al. (2006) used the hierarchical decision Model (AHP) to assess the priority of
safety management elements in Hong Kong manufacturing enterprises. In this model, a selfregulating system is proposed to realize the safety characteristics. De Felice et al., in 2016,
proposed a comprehensive approach AHP to quantify the performance and effectiveness of risk
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management to assess emergency alternatives. Prasad et al., (2013) proposed a hierarchical
decision model for the Indian construction industry OHSAS 18001 to assess the priority of
elements. Infrastructure is divided into transportation, urban infrastructure and public utilities.
Hsu and Wang(2011) defined a complete safety management system in the plan. The study
identified 43 key factors and 15 cultural dimensions of safety. AHP determines the weights
between cultural dimensions. Aminbakhsh et al. (2013) used the AHP model to manage risk
priorities in the construction industry. The model considers the cost of accidents and determines
the appropriate investment for accident prevention. Choices are made through a decision hierarchy
approach. Chang and Lian(2009), developed a safety assessment model for paint production plant
processes. The AHP model defines the weights of different design attributes. The model shows
that companies with ISO 18001 certification have more effective risk management.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
3.1 DMAIC
DMAIC process improvement methodology is through the analysis of the process, with the
method of data statistics to find out the process in need of improvement, project or opportunity as
the research is to optimize the incident management process through the DMAIC method to reduce
the occurrence of accidents. Following the five steps of DMAIC to create a model for incident
management. The DMAIC roadmap is shown in figure 3.

Figure 3: DMAIC Roadmap
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Define — In the first stage, through the analysis of multiple accident situations of KCompany within a recent timespan of five years, the Pareto diagram of the various accidents causes
was obtained by using Minitab, as well as analysis to determine the production process flow of the
enterprise in question. The aim is to successfully identify the key factors responsible for accidents.
Measure — The second phase measures the actual state of the current project. It includes
a description of defined objectives, quantification, collection of incident-related data, and
verification of measurement systems. Then, the scope of factors must be exposed that affect the
target and the data in the production process will be measured and counted.
Analyze — In the third stage, the data that was collected during the measurement stage
will be analyzed and ranked according to the degree of influence of each factor on the project's
objectives. That is, the degree of contribution to the project objectives, to determine the most
critical influencing factors. Then, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) must be conducted on the root causes
of the accidents. Last but not least, the incident improvement priorities will be determined through
the usage of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP).
Improve — In the fourth stage, improving control measures should give priority to solving
the basic incident with a high contribution rate. Then, the optimization plan for key factors will be
formulated. The improvement of the key factors is mainly through the combination of technical
education and management to complete the technical safety countermeasures to focus on solving
the problem of equipment failures, while safety education and safety management mainly focus
on solving the problem of human errors.
Control — the fifth stage, the improvement process will be developed to ensure that the
project will be improved and effectively implemented and maintained in the future.
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3.2 Fault Tree Analysis
The analysis process of this study is to first determine the types of accidents that can occur
in the production process of K-Company. This is done mainly through the analysis of the
production technology, production environment, production equipment, and data that was
collected from the enterprise.
The second is to find the intermediate level incidents and the basic level incidents that lead
to the top accident. The fault tree quantitative analysis of criticality can be from the perspective of
sensitivity, and its probability of occurrence of double reflect fundamental changes to the top
incidents that can happen. This article uses the influence of criticality to represent human error and
equipment failures for the contribution of the top incident, and to analyze the possible accident
risks in the production process of enterprises, and to break down the causes that may lead to
accident risks. Example of fault tree analysis is shown in figure 4.
The basic process is as follows:
1.) The possible accidents of the manufacturing process will be analyzed.
2.) Determine the events and conditions (i.e., intermediate events) that most directly lead
to the top event.
3.) The direct and indirect causes of accidents are found; AND logical symbols such as
OR Gate, AND Gate, Exclusive OR Gate, Priority AND gate are used to construct the
logical relationship diagram between product accidents and causes.
4.) Draw the fault tree according to the previously mentioned analysis. (see Figure 3).
5.) Study the fault tree model and the list of minimal cut sets to identify potentially
important dependencies among events.
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6.) The logical diagram is analyzed qualitatively and quantitatively to identify the
probability of top event, basic incident importance and criticality. Then, to find out the
specific measures to control accidents so as to improve the reliability or safety of the
system.
Suppose that a fault tree has K minimum cut sets: 𝐸1 , 𝐸2 , …, 𝐸𝑟 , 𝐸𝑘 , and the accident tree
is represented by the equivalent tree of its minimum cut set. At this point, the occurrence
probability of the top event is equal to the union of the minimum cut sets.
𝑃(𝑇) = ∑𝑘𝑟=1 ∏𝑋𝑖 ∈𝐸𝑟 𝑞𝑖 − ∑1≤𝑟<𝑠≤𝑘 ∏𝑋𝑖 ∈𝐸𝑟 𝑞𝑖 + ⋯ + (−1)𝑘−1 ∏𝑘𝑟=1 𝑞𝑖

Equation 1

𝑋𝑖 ∈𝐸𝑟

r, s, t -- the ordinal number of the minimum cut-set, r < s < t.
𝑖 -- the sequence number of the basic event.
k -- minimum cut-set number.
1 ≤ 𝑟 < 𝑠 ≤ 𝑘 -- The combination order of the two minimum cut-sets r and s in k
minimum cut-sets;
𝑋𝑖 ∈ 𝐸𝑟 -- the 𝑖 basic event belonging to the minimum cut-set;
The probability importance degree of a basic event refers to the rate of change of the
probability of occurrence of the top event to the probability of occurrence of the basic event. The
probability importance degree of a certain basic event 𝑖 is calculated as follows:

𝐼𝑔 (𝑖) =

𝜕𝑃(𝑇)
𝜕𝑞𝑖

Equation 2

Where 𝐼𝑔 (𝑖) is probability importance coefficient of the basic event 𝑖, 𝑃(𝑇) is probability
of occurrence of top event, 𝑞𝑖 is probability of basic event 𝑖.
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The critical importance degree refers to the ratio of the relative rate of change of the
probability of occurrence of a basic event to that of the probability of occurrence of the top event
to represent the importance degree of the basic event. The calculation formula of a basic event 𝑖
is:
∆𝑃(𝑇)/𝑃(𝑇)

𝐼𝑐 (𝑖) = lim (
∆𝑞𝑖 →0

∆𝑞𝑖 /𝑞𝑖

) =

𝑞𝑖

∆𝑃(𝑇)

𝑞𝑖

∆𝑞𝑖

𝑃(𝑇)

lim (

𝑃(𝑡) ∆𝑞𝑖 →0

) = 𝐼𝑔 (𝑖) ∗

Equation 1

Where 𝐼𝑐 (𝑖) is key importance coefficient of basic event 𝑖.
T

Top incident

Link contributors (OR, AND)

K1

K3

K2

First level

Second level

X1

X2

X3

X4

K4

X5

Basic incident

X6

Figure 4: Example of Fault Tree Analysis

X7
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3.3 Analytic Hierarchy Process
For an accident risk, it is usually described by the possibility and severity of an accident.
In the analysis process of this thesis, the index of controllability is added. Controllability refers to
the ability of an enterprise to control possible accidents, that is, the ability of an enterprise to bear
the possibility and severity of accidents.
To establish the AHP evaluation model (Figure 5), AHP algorithm is used to determine the
relative weight of top incidents, determine the priority, and multiply the criticality of basic
incidents and the relative priority weight of accident type to represent the contribution degree, to
define the impact degree of basic incidents on the overall target.
In the same way, a comprehensive assessment is provided. AHP uses an absolute value
scale from 1 to 9 to make pairwise comparisons. The scale is explained in table 3.

Incident management |A

Probability | 𝐵1

Accident 1 |𝐶1

Severity | 𝐵2

Accident 2 |𝐶2
Figure 5: Example of AHP evaluation model

Controllability | 𝐵3

Accident 3 | 𝐶3
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Table 1. Example of three alternative (B1, B2, B3) pairwise comparison matrices for criterion A.
A

B1

B2

B3

Priority vector

B1

1

B1/B2

B1/B3

%

B2

B2/B1

1

B2/B3

%

B3

B3/B1

B3/B2

1

%

Table 2. The analytic hierarchy process comparison scale.
Absolute value

Definition

1

Equal importance

3

Moderate importance of one over another

5

Strong or essential importance of one over another

7

Very strong or demonstrated importance of one over another

9

Extreme importance of one over another

2,4,6,8

Intermediate values

Reciprocals

Reciprocals for inverse comparison

The consistency ratio (CR) measure is also used in AHP to check the consistency of
judgment. In the process of pair comparison, the decision makers tend to produce inconsistencies
due to negligence or excessive judgment. A CR of 0.1 is considered an acceptable upper limit. If
CR is found to be greater than 0.1, the decision maker need to re-evaluate their judgment in a
pairwise comparison matrix until an acceptable ratio (<0.1) is finally reached.
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When the CR value is obtained, the consistency index (CI) number is used as the
consistency measure.CI is the degree of deviation or consistency calculated using the following
formula
𝐶𝐼 (𝑘) =( λ𝑚𝑎𝑥 -n)/(n-1)

Equation 4

Where λ𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the principle (maximum) eigenvalue obtained by summation of the product
of each element of the eigenvector and the sum of each column of the reciprocal matrix, and n is
the number of comparisons.CI is used to compare it to an appropriate word. An appropriate CI is
called the random consistency index (RI). The average RI is shown in Table 4. The consistency
ratio is the comparison between CI and RI, or expressed by the formula
CR= CI/ RI

Equation 5

If CR ≤ 0.10, the inconsistency is acceptable, otherwise, the subjective judgment is to be
revised.
Table 3. Random consistency index values for n from 1 to 10.
n

1

2

3.00

4.0

5.00

6.00

7.00

8.00

9.00

10

RI

0

0

0.58

0.9

1.12

1.24

1.32

1.41

1.45

1.49
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Chapter 4: Findings
4.1 Data Collection
The course of this research takes place at a manufacturing facility, that will be referred to
as K-Company for confidentiality purposes. K-Company is a comprehensive industrial group
incorporating oil equipment and manufacturing oilfield integration, which is also mainly engaged
in oil drilling and other parts of the industry's machinery manufacturing. The data was obtained
from accident reports generated over the last five years.
The data includes:
•

Collected information on various hazards and risks. While identifying the root
cause and direct cause of a large number of accidents through all relevant reports
and statistics.

•

Identified the production process, analyzed and collected the basic and intermediate
events that lead to accidents, and then uses them for the qualitative analysis of the
fault tree.

•

Collected the probability of the basic event for the quantitative analysis of the fault
tree. The probability of occurrence of basic events includes the probability of failure
of the unit (component) of the system, the probability of human error, etc. The
company uses the frequency of basic events under certain conditions and time to
represent the probability value of basic events.

•

It also is important to collect all information about any kind of near misses or nearby
accidents. Though these near misses do not have a real impact, they are just as
valuable a source of information as real accidents and it is important to derive the
right lessons from them.
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4.2 Analysis
4.2.1 DMAIC - Define
In the past five years, there have been a total of 16 accidents in K-Company, causing
property losses and endangering the lives and health of employees. It also has a negative impact
on the company's reputation and growth prospects. Therefore, the goal of this thesis was to find
out the key factors affecting accidents and propose specific improvement schemes, to provide
employers and workers with the opportunity to identify risks in their operations and defects in
safety and health programs.
Table 4：Incidents type in 2015-2019
Year

Mechanical
Injury

Lifting
Injury

Fire

Falls

Traffic
Accidents

Near-Miss

2015

1

0

0

0

0

4

2016

2

1

0

1

0

2

2017

3

0

1

0

0

3

2018

3

1

1

0

0

2

2019

2

0

0

0

1

2

Total

11

2

2

1

1
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It can be seen from the data that 15 accidents occurred in the manufacturing process. Kcompany has to use a large number of mechanical equipment in the production process, so there
is a greater risk of mechanical injury during the course of production. In addition, in the process
of heat treatment, because the quenching medium is usually flammable oil and there are many
high-temperature operations throughout such as an open flame, but not limited to the failure of a
circulating cooling system or even an electrostatic spark can most certainly be the main hazard
sources of fire.
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The main production processes flow chart of the enterprise is shown in figure 6.

Figure 6. Process flow chart of K company.
4.2.2 DMAIC - Measure
Statistics of the company's safety incidents from 2015 to 2019 are shown in Figure 7. As
can be seen from the figure, in the past five years, incident types such as mechanical injury, fire,
and lifting accidents have been the most frequent.
Through the statistical analysis of the accidents of the enterprise, the Pareto Diagram of
the accidents is obtained by Minitab17.
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Figure 7. Pareto Chart of accidents in K-Company in 2015-2019.
During the definition phase, opportunities and goals for improvement are identified.
Combined with the production process of the enterprise, the data acquisition is mainly focused on
the three processes of heat treatment, production and lifting used in the manufacturing process. In
these three processes, fire accidents, mechanical injury accidents, and lifting accidents are dealt
with respectively.
4.2.3 DMAIC - Analysis
The main mechanical processing equipment involved in the company's production process
includes utilizing cutting machines, plate cutting machines, lathes, planers, milling machines,
presses, etc., and the main ways of mechanical injury caused by such machinery include clamping,
collision, shearing, skewing, grinding, cutting, stabbing, etc.
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The causes of mechanical injury accidents mainly occur due to the operators' failure to
operate mechanical equipment in accordance with operating procedures, the workers' failure to
wear labor protection articles in accordance with regulations, and their weak sense of selfprotection. All kinds of mechanical motions and actions can present hazards to workers. These
may include movement of rotating parts, reciprocating arms, moving belts, meshing gears, cutting
teeth, and any impacting or shearing parts. These different types of dangerous mechanical motions
and actions are fundamental in almost all different combinations of machines, and identifying them
is the first step in protecting workers from the dangers they present.
Table 5. Machinery - Dangerous parts of machinery
Rank

Motions

Hazards

1

Still

Sharp edges and rough surfaces for tools and equipment
Protrusion of mechanical parts

2

Transverse moving

Longitudinal movement of mechanical parts
The part of a machine that moves laterally
A raised mechanical part in a straight line of motion
The combination of the moving part and the stationary
part

3

Rotating

Mechanical part with rotary motion
Danger between two mechanical parts involved in
rotating motion
A swinging mechanical part
A tool in rotary motion
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4

Reciprocating

A mechanical combination of rotary motion and rotary
motion
A mechanical combination of linear motion and rotary
motion

5

Transmission apparatus

A machine throws out Lathe tool
A machine throws out iron filings, work pieces

The fault tree analysis of mechanical injuries is shown in the figure 8.
Using Boolean algebra method to simplify the fault tree, we can get the minimum cut set
of the fault tree:
{M2, M3, M1}, {M9}, {M14, M15}, {M1, M5}, {M11}, {M18, M17}, {M12}, {M13},
{M6, M8}, {M5, M7}, {M5, M8}, {M6, M7}, {M9}, {M16, M7}, {M15}, {M1, M2, M4}, {M19,
M17}.
Table 6. Summary of the basic incidents of mechanical injury.
Name

Data (Probability)

Description

M1

0.065

The machine whirled the iron filings out

M2

0.015

Failure of mechanical protective cover

M3

0.013

No work glasses

M4

0.005

Glasses damaged

M5

0.015

Unreasonable adjustment of tool angle

M6

0.063

Iron filings breaker failure

M7

0.003

No iron filings removal tools

M8

0.006

No tools were used
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M9

0.006

Work with gloves

M10

0.005

The sleeves are not tied well

M11

0.023

Clean up before stopping the lathe

M12

0.017

Pick up before stopping the lathe

M13

0.008

Measure before stopping the lathe

M14

0.071

The work-piece is placed on the lathe surface

M15

0.003

Unstable placement of work-piece

M16

0.006

Operator failed to spot check

M17

0.052

Claw damage

M18

0.036

Rack damage

M19

0.009

Set speed too high

According to formula, the probability of the occurrence of top accident is calculated as
follows:
𝑃(𝑇) = ∑𝑘𝑟=1 ∏𝑀𝑖 ∈𝐸𝑟 𝑞𝑖 − ∑1≤𝑟<𝑠≤𝑘 ∏𝑀𝑖 ∈𝐸𝑟 𝑞𝑖 + ⋯ + (−1)𝑘−1 ∏𝑘𝑟=1 𝑞𝑖

Equation 1

𝑀𝑖 ∈𝐸𝑟

𝑃(𝑇) = 0.07268
According to the formula, the structural importance degree of each basic incident is
calculated:

𝐼𝑔 (𝑖) =

𝜕𝑃(𝑇)
𝜕𝑞𝑖
Equation 2
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Table 7. Structural importance of the basic incidents of mechanical injury.
Name

Structural Importance

M1

0.01092

M2

0.00109

M3

0.00089

M4

0.00095

M5

0.06459

M6

0.00894

M7

0.01978

M8

0.07753

M9

0.05751

M10

0.93290

M11

0.32199

M12

0.23799

M13

0.11199

M14

0.99398

M15

0.03280

M16

0.07057

M17

0.08747

M18

0.00596

M19

0.00457
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Figure 8. Mechanical injury fault tree.
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Calculate the criticality importance of each basic event.
∆𝑃(𝑇)/𝑃(𝑇)

𝐼𝑐 (𝑖) = lim (
∆𝑞𝑖 →0

∆𝑞𝑖 /𝑞𝑖

) =

𝑞𝑖

∆𝑃(𝑇)

𝑞𝑖

∆𝑞𝑖

𝑃(𝑇)

lim (

𝑃(𝑡) ∆𝑞𝑖 →0

) = 𝐼𝑔 (𝑖) ∗

Equation 3

Table 8. Criticality importance of the basic incidents of mechanical injury.
Name

Criticality Importance

M1

0.00911

M2

0.00022

M3

0.00015

M4

0.00006

M5

0.00889

M6

0.00184

M7

0.00775

M8

0.00319

M9

0.00640

M10

0.07701

M11

0.06838

M12

0.31452

M13

0.23247

M14

0.10939

M15

0.03204

M16

0.03204

M17

0.00722

M18

0.00427

M19

0.00295

𝐼c (12) > 𝐼c (13) > 𝐼c (14) > 𝐼c (10) > 𝐼c (11) > 𝐼c (15) > 𝐼c (16) > 𝐼c (1) > 𝐼c (5) > 𝐼c (7) > 𝐼c
(17) >𝐼c (9) > 𝐼c (18) > 𝐼c (8) > 𝐼c (19) > 𝐼c (6) > 𝐼c (2) > 𝐼c (3) > 𝐼c (4)
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When the heating temperature reaches 1050 -1100 ℃, the heat preservation coefficient is
0.8 -1.2min/mm. Then the work-piece is quickly immersed in the quenching medium (mixed oil),
and the depth of the work-piece immersed in the coolant should be greater than 50 mm (to avoid
ignition). After cooling and cleaning, tempering is carried out at 500 ℃, and the tempering time
depends on the process requirements as shown in figure 9. In order to ensure the quenching quality
and safety, the quenching medium must be continuously cooled. Therefore, the quenching oil pool
is equipped with a circulating cooling system.
Some flammable liquids (gasoline, kerosene, and diesel), organic compounds (methanol,
ethanol, acetylene, propane, butane, acetone) used in heat treatment are inflammable and explosive
substances. Heat treatment furnaces using gas and liquid fuels often have fire accidents due to
improper operation. Fire accident tree analysis is carried out for the heat treatment process of the
company.
The fault tree analysis of fire accident is shown in the figure 10.

Figure 9. Heat treatment process.
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Figure 10. Fire accident fault tree.
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Using Boolean algebra method to simplify the fault tree, the minimum cut set of the fault
tree can be obtained: {X6, X10}, {X7, X10}, {X8, X10}, {X9, X11}, {X7, X11}, {X8, X11},
{X9, X11}, {X1, X3, X4, X10}, {X8, X11}, {X1, X3, X4, X11}, {X1, X3, X5, X10}, {X1, X3,
X5, X11}, {X2, X3, X4, X10}, {X2, X3, X4, X11}, {X2, X3, X5, X10}, {X2, X3, X5, X11}.
Table 9. Summary of the basic incidents of fire accident.
Name

Data (Probability)

Description

X1

0.019

Circulating cooling system equipment failure

X2

0.009

Circuit failure of the circulating cooling system

X3

0.014

Temperature sensor failure

X4

0.016

Alarm failure

X5

0.021

Feedback system failure

X6

0.001

Work clothes with static electricity

X7

0.05

No anti-static pad

X8

0.04

Explosion proof electrical appliance failure

X9

0.023

Using fire in violation of rules and regulations

X10

0.001

Explosion proof electrical appliance failure

X11

0.04

Mistakes in the operation of firefighting
equipment

According to the formula, the probability of the top event is calculated as
𝑃(𝑇) = ∑𝑘𝑟=1 ∏𝑋𝑖 ∈𝐸𝑟 𝑞𝑖 − ∑1≤𝑟<𝑠≤𝑘 ∏𝑋𝑖 ∈𝐸𝑟 𝑞𝑖 + ⋯ + (−1)𝑘−1 ∏𝑘𝑟=1 𝑞𝑖
𝑋𝑖 ∈𝐸𝑟

𝑃(𝑇) = 0.0048

Equation 1
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Calculate the structural importance of each basic event:
𝐼𝑔 (𝑖) =

𝜕𝑃(𝑇)

Equation 2

𝜕𝑞𝑖

Table 10. Structural importance of the basic incidents of fire accident.
Name

Structural Importance

X1

0.000021

X2

0.000018

X3

0.000042

X4

0.000016

X5

0.000029

X6

0.049058

X7

0.042832

X8

0.040883

X9

0.039956

X10

0.109335

X11

0.113972

Calculate the criticality importance of each basic event:
∆𝑃(𝑇)/𝑃(𝑇)

𝐼𝑐 (𝑖) = lim (
∆𝑞𝑖 →0

∆𝑞𝑖 /𝑞𝑖

) =

𝑞𝑖

∆𝑃(𝑇)

𝑞𝑖

∆𝑞𝑖

𝑃(𝑇)

lim (

𝑃(𝑡) ∆𝑞𝑖 →0

) = 𝐼𝑔 (𝑖) ∗

Table 11. Criticality importance of the basic incidents of fire accident.
Name

Criticality Importance

X1

0.000086

Equation 3
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X2

0.000041

X3

0.000127

X4

0.000055

X5

0.000072

X6

0.008771

X7

0.138535

X8

0.350182

X9

0.201726

X10

0.023413

X11

0.976219

𝐼c (11) > 𝐼c (7) > 𝐼c (8) > 𝐼c (9) > 𝐼c (10) > 𝐼c (6) > 𝐼c (3) > 𝐼c (1) > 𝐼c (5) > 𝐼c (4) > 𝐼c (2)

In the production and maintenance of equipment and other processes need to use lifting
machinery, which may cause lifting injuries. The main tool is a bridge crane, so the analysis of a
lifting injury accident tree is shown in Figure 11.
Boolean algebra method is used to simplify the fault tree, and the minimum cut set of the
fault tree can be obtained: {L1, L11}, {L3, L11}, {L8, L11}, {L8, L11}, {L4, L11}, {L3, L12},
{L6, L11}, {L7, L11}, {L9, L11}, {L10, L12}, {L8, L12}, {L4, L12}, {L7, L12}, {L12}, {L9,
L12}, {L10, L12}, {L2, L12}.
According to the formula, the probability of the top event is calculated as
𝑃(𝑇) = ∑𝑘𝑟=1 ∏𝑋𝑖 ∈𝐸𝑟 𝑞𝑖 − ∑1≤𝑟<𝑠≤𝑘 ∏𝑋𝑖 ∈𝐸𝑟 𝑞𝑖 + ⋯ + (−1)𝑘−1 ∏𝑘𝑟=1 𝑞𝑖
𝑋𝑖 ∈𝐸𝑟

𝑃(𝑇) = 0.01403

Equation1
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Table 12. Summary of the basic incidents of lifting injury.
Name

Data (Probability)

Description

L1

0.007

Lifting cargo inclines

L2

0.002

Unskillful operation

L3

0.060

Controller failure

L4

0.047

Brake failure

L5

0.003

Lift the hook when the cargo is not stable

L6

0.011

The hoisted goods are stacked too high

L7

0.001

Lifting cargo hits other objects

L8

0.041

Over-limit use of lifting tools

L9

0.012

The spreader is broken

L10

0.005

Impact of the lifted cargo

L11

0.034

There are other operations in the hoisting
work area.

L12

0.033

Non-staff staying in the workplace

Calculate the structural importance of each basic event.
𝐼𝑔 (𝑖) =

𝜕𝑃(𝑇)

Equation 2

𝜕𝑞𝑖

Table 13. Structural importance of the basic incidents of lifting injury.
Name

Structural Importance

L1

0.05848

L2

0.06465

L3

0.06039
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L4

0.04731

L5

0.00413

L6

0.06465

L7

0.00588

L8

0.19706

L9

0.01892

L10

0.02694

L11

0.20303

L12

0.21335

Calculate the criticality importance of each basic event.
∆𝑃(𝑇)/𝑃(𝑇)

𝐼𝑐 (𝑖) = lim (
∆𝑞𝑖 →0

∆𝑞𝑖 /𝑞𝑖

) =

𝑞𝑖

∆𝑃(𝑇)

𝑞𝑖

∆𝑞𝑖

𝑃(𝑇)

lim (

𝑃(𝑡) ∆𝑞𝑖 →0

) = 𝐼𝑔 (𝑖) ∗

Table 14. Criticality importance of the basic incidents of lifting injury.
Name

Criticality Importance

L1

0.02917

L2

0.00922

L3

0.25825

L4

0.21655

L5

0.01383

L6

0.05068

L7

0.00461

L8

0.18894

Equation 3
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L9

0.05529

L10

0.02304

L11

0.49198

L12

0.50179

𝐼c (12) >𝐼c (11) > 𝐼c (3) > 𝐼c (4) > 𝐼c (8) > 𝐼c (9) > 𝐼c (6) > 𝐼c (1) > 𝐼c (10) > 𝐼c (5) > 𝐼c (2) >
𝐼c (7)

Figure 11. Lifting injury fault tree.
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According to the relevant statistical analysis in the previous sections, this thesis establishes
an AHP evaluation model for the company's accident types: fire, mechanical injury and lifting
injury, and the evaluation indexes are possibility, severity and controllability. The AHP hierarchy
model is established.

Figure 12. Incident management AHP hierarchy model
Firstly, a judgment matrix is established. The judgment matrix of criterion layer B to target
layer A is,

𝐸𝐴→𝐵

1
3
1
= [1/3
1/5 1/3

5
3]
1

The judgment matrix of scheme layer C in alignment with gauge layer B is,

𝐸𝐵1→𝐶

1
1/3
=[
1/9

3
9
1
7]
1/3 1
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𝐸𝐵2→𝐶

1
1/2
=[
1/7

2
7
1
5]
1/5 1

𝐸𝐵3→𝐶

1
=[ 3
1/5

1/3 5
1
7]
1/7 1

The second step is to calculate the weight vector and the eigenvector of the judgment
matrix. By standardizing each column of the A-B judgment matrix, it can be obtained as follows:

𝑊A→𝐵

0.5883
= [0.2941
0.1176

0.6 0.5556
0.3 0.3333]
0.1 0.1111

The weight vector of the criterion layer to the target layer is,
𝑊𝐴 = [0.582, 0.309 , 0.109]𝑇
The maximum eigenvalue is,
𝐴𝑊

λ𝑀𝐴𝑋 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑛𝑊𝑖= 3.004
𝑖

Equation 6

The consistency test is carried out for the judgment matrix,
𝐶𝐼 =

λ𝑀𝐴𝑋 −𝑛
𝑛−1

=

3.004−3
3−1

= 0.002

Equation 4

By looking up the table, it can be seen that the 4-order matrix RI=0.58,
𝐶𝑅 =

𝐶𝐼

=
𝑅𝐼

0.002
0.58

= 0.0034 < 0.1

Therefore, the consistency test of the judgment matrix is passed.
So the weight vector of the criterion layer to the target layer is,
𝑊𝐴 = [0.582, 0.309 , 0.109]𝑇

Equation 5
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The corresponding eigenvectors and consistency test values of the judgment matrix B1,
B2, and B1 can be obtained as follows:
𝑊𝐵1 = [0.655, 0.29 , 0.055]𝑇 , λ𝑀𝐴𝑋 =

𝐴𝑊𝑖
𝑛𝑊𝑖

𝑊𝐵2 = [0.592, 0.333 , 0.075]𝑇 , λ𝑀𝐴𝑋 =

𝐴𝑊𝑖

𝑊𝐵3 = [0.279, 0.649 , 0.072]𝑇 , λ𝑀𝐴𝑋 =

𝐴𝑊𝑖

𝑛𝑊𝑖

𝑛𝑊𝑖

= 3.08, CR = 0.069 < 0.1

Equation 6

= 3.014, CR = 0.012 < 0.1 Equation 6

= 3.065, CR = 0.055 < 0.1 Equation 6

Find the resultant weight vector of all judgment matrices. Then the total ranking result of
the hierarchy is,
0.625
𝑊𝑇 = 𝑊𝐵𝑖 ∗ 𝑊𝐴 = [0.238
0.137

0.481
0.405
0.114

0.122 0.582
0.32 ] [0.309] = (0.594, 0.343, 0.063)𝑇
0.558 0.109

Equation 5
The overall consistency test is passed, so the weight coefficient of mechanical injury, fire
and lifting injury to the total target is 0.594, 0.343 and 0.063 respectively.
Table 15. The degree to which basic incidents contribute to safety incident management.
Accident Type

Basic

Criticality

Priority

Incidents

Importance

Weight

Contribution

Mechanical Injury

M1

0.00912

0.594

0.00541

Mechanical Injury

M2

0.00023

0.594

0.00013

Mechanical Injury

M3

0.00016

0.594

0.00009

Mechanical Injury

M4

0.00007

0.594

0.00004
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Mechanical Injury

M5

0.00889

0.594

0.00528

Mechanical Injury

M6

0.00185

0.594

0.00109

Mechanical Injury

M7

0.00775

0.594

0.00461

Mechanical Injury

M8

0.00319

0.594

0.00190

Mechanical Injury

M9

0.00640

0.594

0.00381

Mechanical Injury

M10

0.07701

0.594

0.04574

Mechanical Injury

M11

0.06838

0.594

0.04062

Mechanical Injury

M12

0.31452

0.594

0.18683

Mechanical Injury

M13

0.23247

0.594

0.13809

Mechanical Injury

M14

0.10939

0.594

0.06498

Mechanical Injury

M15

0.03204

0.594

0.01903

Mechanical Injury

M16

0.03204

0.594

0.01903

Mechanical Injury

M17

0.00722

0.594

0.00429

Mechanical Injury

M18

0.00426

0.594

0.00254

Mechanical Injury

M19

0.00295

0.594

0.00175

Lifting Injury

L1

0.02917

0.063

0.00184

Lifting Injury

L2

0.00922

0.063

0.00058

Lifting Injury

L3

0.25825

0.063

0.01627

Lifting Injury

L4

0.21655

0.063

0.01364

Lifting Injury

L5

0.01383

0.063

0.00087

Lifting Injury

L6

0.05068

0.063

0.00319

Lifting Injury

L7

0.00461

0.063

0.00029
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Lifting Injury

L8

0.18890

0.063

0.01191

Lifting Injury

L9

0.05529

0.063

0.00348

Lifting Injury

L10

0.02304

0.063

0.00145

Lifting Injury

L11

0.49198

0.063

0.03099

Lifting Injury

L12

0.50179

0.063

0.03161

Fire Accident

X1

0.00009

0.343

0.00003

Fire Accident

X2

0.00004

0.343

0.00001

Fire Accident

X3

0.00013

0.343

0.00004

Fire Accident

X4

0.00006

0.343

0.00002

Fire Accident

X5

0.00007

0.343

0.00003

Fire Accident

X6

0.00877

0.343

0.00301

Fire Accident

X7

0.13854

0.343

0.04752

Fire Accident

X8

0.35018

0.343

0.12011

Fire Accident

X9

0.20173

0.343

0.06919

Fire Accident

X10

0.02341

0.343

0.00803

Fire Accident

X11

0.97622

0.343

0.33484

X11 > M12 > M13 > X 8 > X 9 > M14 > X7 > M 10 > M 11 > L 12 > L 11 > M 15 > M16 > L3 > L4 >
L8 > X10 > L8 > M 1 > M 5 > M 7 > M 17 > M 9 > L 9 > L6 > X6 > M 18 > M8 > L 1 > M 19 > L 10 >
M 6 > L5 > L2 > L7 > M 2 > M 3 > X3 > M 4 > X1 > X5 > X4 > X2
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Figure 13. Pareto chart of the contribution of each basic incident.
4.2.4 DMAIC - Improve
The ultimate purpose of this thesis is to find and propose a solution to improve key factors,
which is human error and equipment failure. Through the define, measure and analysis of the three
stages of work, the main reasons affecting the incident management have been identified, and the
key factors leading to the occurrence of safety production accidents have been found, as well as
the direction of safety incident management improvement has been made clear. The goal of this
phase is to find the best solution for controlling these key factors.
The process of improving the key factors is mainly accomplished through the combination
of technology, education, and management methods.
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The safety technology countermeasure focuses on solving the problem of the unsafe state
of the object. Safety education and safety management methods mainly focus on solving the
problem of unsafe human behavior.
The main countermeasures of safety technology include:
Control energy — The severity after an accident is related to the energy that causes the
accident. However, the source of energy is mainly the system itself, so the way of controlling
energy can fundamentally guarantee the safety of the system.
Risk minimization design — By eliminating the danger through design, even if human
error or equipment failure will not lead to the accident, which fundamentally guarantees the safety
of the system. However, such conditions are difficult to achieve, so only as far as possible to
minimize the risk or to reduce to an acceptable level to ensure the safety of the system.
Isolation — In some ways, the safety goal is achieved by isolating the dangerous person
from the equipment and avoiding the transmission of accidents.
Latching, interlocking, and locking — These three ways can reduce the ability of human
error to cause accidents and improve the ability to control the consequences of human error.
Fail-safe — A fail-safe device is a design feature or practice that, in the event of a specific
type of failure, inherently reacts in a way that causes minimal or no harm to other equipment, the
environment, or people.
The alarm — Inform the relevant personnel of the existence of dangers and problems
requiring attention through prompts so as to take timely and correct measures to avoid accidents.
The main methods of safety education countermeasures include:
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Safety awareness — One of the main reasons for bad safety work is a lack of safety
awareness. Most people think that increasing the safety level will increase investment, but this is
not the case. In order to improve safety awareness, it is necessary to do a good job in the content
and form of safety training for the training objects so as to ensure that the content of the training
is highly targeted, diverse and effective.
Safety skills — Improve the skill level, analytical ability, emergency judgment and
handling ability of employees through safety education.
The main methods of safety management countermeasures.
Safety inspection — First of all, check the degree of perfection and implementation of the
existing safety management system. Then, safety environment inspection, identification of
accident risk in advance, and also checking the implementation of safety improvement measures.
Specific ways are: general inspection, professional inspection, seasonal inspection.
Safety review — Mainly for new and expansion projects, according to laws and
regulations. Safety evaluation includes safety and evaluation, safety status evaluation and safety
acceptance evaluation, mainly aiming at new projects. The three processes of construction,
production and project acceptance are analyzed for hazardous factors, identifying hazards and
proposing control measures.
According to the actual situation of the company, the improvement control measures
should give priority to solving the key factors with high contribution rate. Through the
understanding of the company's production and management process, make the improvement plan.
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Table 16. Key factors improvement schemes.
Key Factors

Causes

Control Measure

Personnel operating Insufficient fire protection 1. Emergency action plan detailing what to
fire

equipment training for personnel.

error.

do in the event of a fire.
2. Fire prevention plan, describing how to
prevent fire.
3. Improve the fire training system, phased
implementation of fire test, fire drill held
regularly.

Clean, pick up and 1. The operator does not 1. Install Man-machine Safety Interlock
measure

before have

stopping the lathe.

enough

safety Switches and a light curtain uses a row or

awareness.

grid of beams to detect intrusions and stop

2. Lack of protective gear.

or prevent potentially dangerous operations.
2.

Organize

staff

to

carry

out

comprehensive training. Ensure that all
employees in this position are able to attend
and complete all training for their position.
Electrostatic

1. Friction in work clothes 1. Install anti-static tape and maintain high
creates static electricity.

humidity by installing a spray device.

2. No barrier device is 2. Provide workers with synthetic clothing,
equipped

to

generating loops.

avoid as natural fibers such as wool, cotton, and
flax usually produce less static electricity
than synthetic fibers such as polyester.
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Work with gloves Protective clothing and Comprehensive operator training shall
on, sleeves not tied equipment
properly

hazards.

can
A

create include guidance or hands-on training for

protective new

operators

and

maintenance

or

glove or sleeves that can installation personnel, when any new or
become caught between changed safety measures are put into use, or
rotating parts.

when workers are assigned to new machines
or operations.

There

are

other 1. Lift Team did not 1. All personnel involved in planning/

operations in the conduct a risk assessment performing lifting and maintaining lifting
hoisting work area.

of the work area.

equipment shall be trained and competent

2. The operator does not for their duties. Training and regular
have

enough

awareness.

safety assessment are essential means of ensuring
capacity.
2. All persons should be kept away from
overhead loads and potential areas of impact

The work piece is

The operator does not have Implement 5S management to ensure all

placed on the lathe

enough safety awareness. items are in order and placed in the

face, or the work

A small tool thrown into a designated place. Organize all items left in

piece is placed

cycling lathe can easily the workplace in a logical way so that they

unsteadily

turn into a bullet and hit can more easily accomplish tasks.
the injured person.
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Crane controller

1. No equipment

1. The integrity of equipment shall be

failure

inspection.

maintained and assisted by equipment

Crane brake failure

2. Operators do not have

registration.

Crane spreader out

sufficient safety skills and

2. Lifting appliances and equipment shall be

of limit

awareness.

subject to detailed/thorough inspection by a
qualified person at least every 12 months
and equipment used for lifting shall be
subject to inspection at least every 6
months.
3. All lifting gear and equipment should be
visually inspected before use
The load shall not exceed the dynamic
and/or static capacity of the lifting
equipment.
4. The integrity and stability of the load
should be checked before hoisting.
Lifting operations will be carried out in
accordance

with

a

documented

management system.
The
whirled

machine 1. Unreasonable selection
the

iron of cutting tools.

1. Check whether the chip protection
device and protection net are safe and
reliable before cutting.

filings out

2. Excessive cutting.

2. Train operators on how to handle iron
filings correctly. In the high speed cutting
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3. The protective device is

high strength, high toughness metal, must

out of order.

take the strip iron filings cutting measures,
such as: change the Angle of the cutting
tool, repair and wear groove, select a
reasonable feed amount; Use coolant to
flush the iron filings, change the direction of
iron filings spray.
3. Special tools such as hooks and brushes
must be used to remove chips.
4. Timely observe the iron filings shape and
movement direction during the cutting
process, select the safety station, and clean
up and adjust when necessary.
5. Wear the labor insurance correctly. Do
not leave the cuffs and neckline open.

Chip breaker failure 1. The device exceeds its Implement equipment and facility life cycle
service life

management,

carry

out

spot

check,

2. Omission in equipment maintenance, scrap and other processes.
inspection

Organize safety training for operators to
improve their ability to identify equipment
risks.
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4.2.5 DMAIC - Control
The control stage is the last stage of DMAIC mode, which is the maintenance and
continuous improvement of DMAIC safety production management. It is extremely important for
any DMAIC problem-solving project to maintain the stability of improvement, which is the role
of process management, it helps ensure that the work done with this process is not slowly forgotten.
The main work in the control stage is to track and evaluate the improvement effect of the
safe production process and verify it, and at the same time formulate and document the
improvement measures. When done properly, improvements can be sustained over the long term.
K-company needs to continuously collect data of key factors affecting the occurrence of
production accidents and monitor the improvement of safe production process for a long time.
Establish a standardized work flow, strictly require that the corresponding safety inspection, safety
preparation and so on should be done before each supply and demand.
Employees shall be regularly organized to carry out hazard factor identification activities
and review and summarize the implementation effect of hazard factor identification activities in
this year.
During the implementation process, the company shall organize and inspect the
implementation of incident management report on implementation in the form of thematic
meetings.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion, and Recommendations
Through the analysis of the DMAIC process improvement methodology, this thesis
explores and studies the application of DMAIC management method to safety incident
management, and mainly obtains the following research results:
•

Created a DMAIC process improvement program for incident management in the safety
field.

•

In this thesis, the data obtained can be used for quantitative risk analysis through fault tree
analysis. Based on the failure risk, this thesis proposes a kind of sequencing based on the
existing data and the basic events affecting the event management with structured
judgment. This approach enhances the rigor of quantitative risk analysis by focusing on the
most important factors.

•

A case study was given to illustrate that the focus of FTA and AHP for safety incident
management was to find out the key factors affecting the safety target by Pareto Chart and
propose specific improvement schemes, based on the result of the factors, which could
effectively and quickly solve the safety problem of enterprises.
Although this thesis has established a DMAIC problem-solving model for the safety

incident management process of enterprises, but due to the time relationship and the author's own
limited ability, this model still has some imperfections.
In the follow-up work, the determination of the key safety factors remains to be improved.
In addition, further risk analysis is needed to ensure the effectiveness of the plan after the proposed
safety improvement control measures, so as to ensure that the plan can carry out cyclic control
improvement of safety incident management.
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